DEBATE
LIGHT AT THE END OF THE PIPELINE?: CHOOSING A
FORUM FOR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
Despite the fact that six years have passed since 9/11, the Pentagon’s recent decision to try six Guantanamo detainees for capital
crimes such as “terrorism and support of terrorism” made national
headlines. William Glaberson, “U.S. Charges 6 With Key Roles in
9/11 Attacks,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1. In this Debate, Professors Amos N. Guiora, of the University of Utah, and John T. Parry, of
Lewis & Clark Law School, attempt to settle the question of what sort
of forum is most appropriate to try the thousands of individuals in
U.S. custody who are suspected of terrorism.
Professor Guiora considers three forum options: treaty-based international terror courts, traditional Article III courts, and a “hybrid”
option he calls domestic terror courts. Ultimately, Professor Guiora
argues in favor of domestic terror courts, which he describes as being
able to “balance[] the legitimate rights of the individual with the
equally legitimate national security rights of the state.” He considers
this option to be the most practical and expedient policy solution, necessitated by an untenable tension between the understanding “that
some of the detainees present a genuine threat to American national
security,” and an awareness “that indefinite detention violates constitutional principles and fundamental concepts of morality.”
Professor Parry agrees that current U.S. policy toward detainees
has been “misguided,” but does not believe that innovations of the
sort proposed by Professor Guiora are necessary. Rather, he suggests
“that policymakers should choose Article III courts rather than hybrid
courts for trials of suspected terrorists, with military courts as a fallback option.” Professor Parry points to research that shows that “the
federal government is often able to prosecute suspected terrorists in
federal court,” and therefore considers alternative proposals to Article
III courts to be “solution[s] in search of a problem.” Professor Parry
realizes that “trial in federal court will not be possible for every suspected terrorist,” and concludes that, “[f]or people who pose a risk
but whose conduct may not violate federal criminal law, prolonged
preventive detention is the best choice.”
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OPENING STATEMENT
Suspected Terrorists: Domestic Terror Courts Are Waiting!
†

Amos N. Guiora

Six years after 9/11, and more than a year and a half after Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld and the Military Commissions Act (MCA) one of the critical questions of the post-9/11 world has still gone unanswered: where
do we try terrorists? More accurately, where do we try the 25,000 individuals held worldwide either by the United States—or on behalf of
the United States —who are suspected of terrorism? I deliberately italicize the word “suspected” because it is important to recall that the individual in question is no more than that—a suspect. He or she may
be the “worst of the worst” (per then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s
outrageous description of all individuals held at Guantanamo Bay), or
he or she might be like the hundreds of detainees released from
Guantanamo Bay who the United States had no reason to detain in
the first place.
The question Professor Parry and I are addressing—where to try
suspected terrorists—encompasses a range of complex definitional
problems. For example, how do we define the individual detainee?
Who is he? What has he done? Why did we detain him? What are his
rights? The following questions are also pertinent: when may an individual be detained? Under what conditions (and how) may he be interrogated? What evidence may be introduced into a court of law and
by what process? May he know the charges against him (and when)?
And, if convicted, where may he appeal?
Let’s begin with the basics: The individual presently or in the future is, I suggest, not a criminal, nor is he a prisoner of war (POW),
but he is something. That something has defied definition to date. Because this individual’s status defies definition, articulating a rightsbased regime for that individual has frustrated the Bush administration’s post-9/11 efforts. At the same time, articulating a rights-based
regime has defined the Bush administration’s efforts. If the individual
is neither a criminal nor a POW, what is he? Various terms have been
bandied about including enemy combatant, illegal combatant, illegal
belligerent, and enemy belligerent. None has led to the establishment
of a workable rights-based regime. To get there, the starting point
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must be that all individuals have rights, and all individuals must be defined.
In numerous decisions (Rasul v. Bush, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld), the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to
articulate what legal term of art is appropriate for the detainees and
what their rights are. Congress has completely failed in its constitutionally granted oversight powers. Checks and balances and separation of powers have largely fallen by the wayside. The result is an
amorphous and vague legal regime. The bottom line is a lack of a bottom line.
Into that vacuum, I present the following proposal: the post-9/11
detainees are a “hybrid”—neither POW nor criminal. What does that
mean? A “hybrid” suggests taking a bit from here and a bit from there
in an effort to articulate a workable model. This model would enable
a fair trial for those detained post-9/11; it would stand as a dramatic
improvement over the status quo since, to date, no fair process has
been developed by the Bush administration.
Let us examine the efforts to date: The military commissions,
whether in their original construction or their revamped construction
after Hamdan and the Military Commissions Act, have not proven successful. Thus far, only one detainee has been convicted. Recently the
Legal Advisor to the Convening Authority for the Office of Military
Commissions, Brigadier General Thomas W. Hartmann, testified before Congress that evidence obtained from a detainee subjected to waterboarding could be admitted—this, despite universal condemnation
of waterboarding as torture. These facts speak resoundingly to the
military commission’s inadequate and ineffective safeguards for suspected terrorists. It is clear that, even in their revamped format, these
efforts are, in a word, nonstarters.
On the other hand, as the United States is either directly or indirectly responsible for the detainees it holds, the country must develop
a workable judicial process quickly. Given that some of the detainees
present a genuine threat to American national security and that indefinite detention violates constitutional principles and fundamental
concepts of morality, this is a must.
There are, I suggest, three workable legal-judicial models for the
“post-9/11 detainees” (Guantanamo Bay is no longer a workable
model):
1) Treaty-based international terror court;
2) Traditional Article III courts;
3) Domestic terror courts.
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TREATY-BASED INTERNATIONAL TERROR COURT

While attractive-sounding in light of globalization trends, the concept of a treaty-based international terror court is not the answer to
our problem. The reason is simple: in order to establish such a court,
the nations of the world (at least those who would be party to such an
institution) would need to agree upon a definition of the term “terrorism.” As has been documented elsewhere, agreeing upon a definition
of terrorism eludes the FBI and the State and Defense Departments.
The United Nation’s role post-9/11 has been at best—speaking politely—extraordinarily limited as member nations similarly cannot
agree upon a definition of terrorism.
Supposing that this enormous stumbling block could be overcome, member nations would then need to address a laundry list of
issues. To mention a few: imposition of the death penalty, jurisdiction over domestic terrorism (of another nation), cooperation regarding intelligence gathering and sharing, rules of evidence, and prison
conditions. While this is only a partial list, the point is clear: the establishment of a treaty-based international terror court, though perhaps worthwhile, will not be an immediate development. In the
meantime, there are detainees awaiting trial.
II. ARTICLE III COURTS
While I dare not put words in Professor Parry’s mouth, my assumption is that he will articulate in a most convincing manner why
Article III courts are the favored course. As the best offense is a good
defense, bringing post-9/11 detainees to a traditional criminal trial is,
to be blunt, a fantasy.
The trial of Zacarias Moussaoui—held out by some as an example
justifying the effectiveness of Article III courts for terrorists—
highlights the many problems attendant with trying suspected terrorists in an Article III court. Moussaoui, often referred to as “the 20th
hijacker,” was suspected of training with al-Qaeda in preparation for
the 9/11 attacks and later pled guilty to six counts of conspiracy.
While initially denying involvement, he ultimately confessed that he
was supposed to fly a fifth plane into the White House. Grandstanding throughout the process, Moussaoui largely turned the trial into a
farce. The court—particularly when Moussaoui chose to represent
himself—was largely unequipped to respond to or prevent his antics,
which significantly affected public perception of the judicial process.
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Furthermore, Moussaoui’s trial raised Sixth Amendment compulsory due process concerns. See Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L.
Schwartz, With all Due Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795 (2004). Preparing his defense, Moussaoui
asked for “access to alleged terrorist ringleader Ramzi bin al-Shibh,”
id. at 835, who at the time was in federal custody, because Moussaoui
believed bin al-Shibh could provide exculpatory evidence. The government, however, argued that giving Moussaoui such access would
compromise national security. Id. The court “agreed with Moussaoui,
holding that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is not
outweighed by claims that the government’s intelligence-gathering efforts would be undermined.” Id. at 835-36. “Moussaoui would be
given access to, and could present to the jury, a compilation of summaries of reports of bin Al-Shibh’s statements taken by the government.” Id. at 837. The court’s decision highlights the ongoing conflicts between a suspected terrorist defendant’s rights and the
government’s security concerns.
The fundamental deficiencies with using Article III courts in a terrorist context are inherent. First, much of the evidence available
against suspected terrorists is predicated on intelligence information.
Article III courts, however, must abide by certain constitutional rights,
including the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accuser. This
right places an explicit limitation on the prosecution. It deprives the
prosecutor of the ability to go forth with all available (and confidential) intelligence information, since the defendant would not be able
to confront it.
In addition, a defendant in an Article III court has a right to trial
by a “jury of his peers.” See Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 330
(1970) (defining “peers” as “‘his neighbors, fellows, associates, [and]
persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds’”
(quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)). Put simply, if Osama bin Laden were detained today and brought before a
court of law, would it be possible to find a “jury of his peers”? Would
it be possible to find 12 members of the community willing to sit in
judgment of the most wanted terrorist on the planet?
While an instinctual, reflexive, revenge-based answer is yes, closer
scrutiny suggests that fears of retribution from bin Laden supporters
would drive the overwhelming majority of potential jurors literally
“underground.” Two principal staples of Article III courts are, in essence, incompatible with terrorism-related trials: the right to confront
one’s accusers, and the right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers.
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Others raise similar concerns. For example, Jack Goldsmith and
Neal Katyal suggest that criminal prosecutions are “not always feasible.” Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’ Court,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19. For instance, “some alleged terrorists have not committed overt crimes and can be tried only on a conspiracy theory that comes close to criminalizing group membership.”
Id. Also, the standard of proof for evidence collected in Afghanistan
“might not meet every jot and tittle of American criminal law.” Id.
Goldsmith and Katyal argue that instead, Congress should “establish a
comprehensive system of preventive detention that is overseen by a
national security court composed of federal judges with life tenure.”
Id.
III. THE SOLUTION: DOMESTIC TERROR COURTS
Domestic terror courts address the principal issues associated with
Article III courts. By enabling the government to introduce available
intelligence information, domestic terror courts create a forum for the
government to present its case in full. Does this affect the rights of
the defendant? In full candor, the answer is yes. But, the proposed
court will protect the defendant by ensuring that the court will not
automatically accept the introduced intelligence into the record.
That is, the government will have to show that the intelligence information is valid, viable, relevant, and corroborated. Strict scrutiny that balances the legitimate rights of the individual with the equally legitimate
national security rights of the state is one of the significant advantages
of the proposed domestic court.
Under my proposal, intelligence information would be presented
in camera by the prosecutor and a representative of the intelligence
services who would be subject to rigorous cross-examination by the
court. The judges who would sit on the domestic terror courts would
be trained in understanding intelligence information. In addition,
the bench would be expected to fulfill a “double role”—that of factfinder and defense counsel alike. As the latter will be barred from attending the hearings when intelligence information is submitted, the
domestic terror courts would have to proactively engage the prosecutor.
The burden on the court would be enormously significant because the
defendant, who would not be present, would not have counsel representing him with respect to the submission of intelligence information
into the record.
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This is a major stumbling block regarding domestic terror courts.
Based on my experience sitting as a judge in administrative detention
hearings where the only evidence relevant to the detainee was intelligence information, the burden on the judge is significant. However, it
is the only manner in which intelligence information can be submitted. In analyzing terrorism-related cases, it is critical that the role of
intelligence information be fully understood: it is all but impossible to
conduct a terrorism-related case without it. That is, without making
intelligence information available, no court can fully understand or
appreciate the role a particular defendant has played in a terrorist
cell. Without that information, a court cannot understand the inner
workings of a terrorist cell, its goals, missions, and motivations. Without that information, a court will be, in essence, groping in the dark.
Some in favor of Article III courts suggest that
[t]he difficulties involved in using classified evidence in terrorism prosecutions do not provide compelling support for an argument that the
criminal justice system should be abandoned in terrorism cases; these
difficulties are entirely self-imposed. . . . If the government determines
that it is more important to national security that a piece of information
remain secret than to prosecute the terrorist, it can simply choose not to
use that information or not to charge that terrorist until some unclassified evidence of his guilt can be presented. If the government determines that it is more important to national security to prosecute the terrorist than to keep the information in question secret—perhaps to
prevent him from carrying out a terrorist attack—it can simply declassify
the information and use it as evidence against him.

Michael German, Trying Enemy Combatants in Civilian Courts, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1421, 1426-27 (2007).
While this argument is true—the government can choose whether
to prosecute a terrorist based on whether they want to disclose intelligence information—it is inherently limiting. The government is
caught in an all-or-nothing situation: either it keeps intelligence information secret, or it prosecutes terrorists. This highlights both the
importance of intelligence information (essential in order to try terrorists) and the Article III courts’ inability to properly account for its
importance. Domestic terror courts, on the other hand, allow the
government both to maintain the secrecy of intelligence information
and to try suspected terrorists. As George Washington wrote in 1777,
The necessity of procuring good Intelligence, is apparent and need not
be further urged. All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the
whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in
most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue.
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Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 811, 811 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
from a Letter from George Washington to Col. Elias Dayton (July 26,
1777), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 479 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931)).

FINAL THOUGHT
Domestic terror courts are not problem-free—far from it. However, the suggested proposal would make it possible to try an individual suspected of terrorism in a court of law while simultaneously balancing his legitimate rights with the state’s equally legitimate national
security rights. The other available models—Guantanamo Bay, a
treaty-based international terror court, and Article III courts—would
not and do not meet this requirement.
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REBUTTAL
Managing Suspected Terrorists
John T. Parry

†

Guantanamo Bay currently houses 275 people designated as “enemy combatants,” many of whom may have engaged in war crimes or
“terrorist” activities. Fourteen of these prisoners are “high value detainees” formerly held by the CIA at other locations. Some of the
more than 600 people held by U.S. forces at Bagram, Afghanistan—
and perhaps people in other locations as well—may have committed
similar acts. Beginning shortly after 9/11, a fierce debate has been
raging in U.S. legal and policy circles about where to hold these people, how to treat them, whether to put them on trial and, if they are to
be tried, where and for what.
Professor Guiora’s contribution to this debate ably sets out the
case for using hybrid courts for trials of suspected terrorists who are
not U.S. citizens. He rejects both military commissions and criminal
trials in Article III courts as unworkable. A hybrid approach, he suggests, will allow policymakers to pick the best of both models while
avoiding the vices of each. We can have the “war on terror” equivalent
of guns and butter: criminal trials that will satisfy concerns about classified information and allow the conviction of terrorists while also respecting due process values.
I will begin my response by considering what is at stake in the controversy over trying suspected terrorists. Based on that discussion, I
will suggest that policymakers should choose Article III courts rather
than hybrid courts for trials of suspected terrorists, with military courts
as a fall-back option. I will also suggest that critics of U.S. policy
should abandon the idea of trials in many cases and instead support a
straightforward policy of preventive detention combined with continued transfer of prisoners to other countries.
I.

PRACTICAL ISSUES IN THE TRIAL OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS

A number of commentators have advanced proposals for dealing
with suspected terrorists. Many reject the idea that Article III courts
can handle the job, but that rejection comes too easily. Kelly Moore,
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the former Chief of the Violent Crimes and Terrorism Section of the
U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York, argued in a
recent article that a proactive investigation and prosecution policy after the 9/11 attacks resulted in significant intelligence information as
well as successful prosecutions. See Kelly Moore, The Role of Federal
Criminal Prosecutions in the War on Terrorism, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
837, 847-48 (2007). Writing in the same issue of the journal, Professor
Robert Chesney contended that federal prosecution of terrorism offenses should be seen as a “narrative of success.” Robert M. Chesney,
Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing
Data in Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and “Data-Reliability” Critiques, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 889 (2007). Finally, a September 2007
A.B.A. Journal article reported that the federal government has won
thirty-one out of thirty-eight terrorism cases, and some of the cases
scored as losses still resulted in convictions. See Edward A. Adams, 31
Wins, 6 Losses & 1 Tie, A.B.A.J., Sept. 2007, at 24-26.
In short, the federal government is often able to prosecute suspected terrorists in federal court. The success of terrorism prosecutions suggests that in many instances proposals for military commissions and hybrid courts are a solution in search of a problem.
Legitimate issues do exist, however. Attorney General and former
federal district court judge Michael Mukasey insists that terrorism
prosecutions strain resources and “risk disclosure to our enemies of
methods and sources of intelligence.” Michael B. Mukasey, Jose Padilla
Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15. Kelly Moore admits
that applying the rules of evidence to materials obtained in combat
operations can be difficult, while in a forthcoming Stanford Law Review
article Professors Chesney and Jack Goldsmith express concerns about
hearsay and classified information. See Robert M. Chesney & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
To the extent that Attorney General Mukasey’s concern about resources is simply an issue of cost, the obvious solution is more resources, including shifting federal resources from areas that state
prosecutors and courts are competent to handle. As for concerns
about evidence, Moore suggests answers to chain of custody and authentication issues. At least some hearsay concerns are addressed by
Federal Rule of Evidence 807, which permits introduction of hearsay
that has “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Classified information is addressed to some extent by the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA). Terrorism prosecutions raise difficult CIPA
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issues, but, as Moore notes, some information can be declassified,
while Professors Chesney and Goldsmith admit that courts have found
ways to give information to defendants without compromising national security. Some information may be released by mistake, which
appears to be Attorney General Mukasey’s primary evidentiary concern. But the mistakes he cites, while serious, have been few and do
not appear to have caused significant harm. Thus, unless one believes
that no mistakes are tolerable in a war on terror, Article III courts are
more than capable of handling classified information issues.
Professor Guiora raises some of these concerns, and I suspect he
will not be satisfied with my handling of them. He also notes that
Zacarias Moussaoui turned his trial into a spectacle. Certainly, high
profile terrorism trials are likely to be spectacles. But many “ordinary”
criminal trials are spectacles (O.J., anyone?), and many terrorism
prosecutions have ended in plea bargains. Problems with grandstanding defendants are neither limited to terrorism (remember the Chicago 7 or 8?) nor characteristic of it (José Padilla did not engage in it).
At the end of the day, courts can address practical issues of the kind
raised by Professor Guiora and others in the majority of cases. For
some terrorism trials judges will have to be more creative than in ordinary trials, but I suspect they are up to the task.
Solutions to these concerns also will not generalize across the
criminal law in most cases. That is to say, borrowing from Bill Stuntz,
many of these solutions are not “transsubstantive.” William J. Stuntz,
Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002). At least
two issues may require solutions that generalize, however. First, Professor Guiora suggests that Confrontation Clause doctrine will impair
some judicial efforts to allow introduction of probative and reliable
evidence. He is correct, unless doctrine changes. Any change in Confrontation Clause doctrine, however—such as a move towards more
balancing of interests—likely would apply to all criminal trials.
A second issue—also noted by Professor Guiora—involves the
definition of criminal offenses. To the extent that terrorism prosecutions rely on ordinary criminal statutes, such as conspiracy, prosecutors may push for broader definitions of the offense which, if upheld
by courts, can be applied in other contexts as well. Thus, while most
issues surrounding the use of Article III courts are solvable, terrorism
trials—much like the war on drugs—could produce doctrinal changes
that many people would find undesirable.
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II. MILITARY COURTS AND HYBRID TRIALS AS POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Not all proposals to bypass Article III courts derive from concerns
about procedure and doctrine. Avoiding questions about detention
conditions and interrogation practices appears to be a goal as well,
though I should note that Professor Guiora explicitly does not rely on
this goal. Having chosen a parallel system of detention and interrogation after 9/11, policymakers now face the prospect of revealing details about their treatment of specific individuals—as happened to
some extent in the trial of José Padilla. Some of the claims that courts
will release too much intelligence information may be a cover for this
concern as well. New forums and procedures make it easier to insulate investigation practices from public view.
Similarly, some of the concern about expending resources on terrorism trials in Article III courts comes down to the cost of trial rights.
Since 9/11, the United States has adopted a policy of capturing terrorists, interrogating them, and then detaining them for a very long time.
Implementing that policy in an effective way requires executive control. Courts, defense lawyers, and trial rights make that policy less effective by raising its cost and introducing risk. New forums and procedures, by contrast, will make the policy more efficient.
The capture-interrogate-detain pipeline also requires public support, particularly the support of legal, media, and policy elites. Support, in turn, derives to a large extent from perceptions of legitimacy.
Criminal trials can add legitimacy, but they also risk undermining the
policy by disrupting the pipeline. Policymakers might conclude that
the obvious solution is enough trial process to add legitimacy, but with
restrictions that ensure convictions in the vast majority of cases.
A final reason for concern over criminal trials is the belief that terrorism presents more than an ordinary crime control challenge. For
people who hold this view, the “war on terror” is a real war, which
means that the kinds of responses that sufficed for the “war on drugs”
do not go far enough. Ideas of necessity and emergency power play a
role here, as does the simple assertion that rules of war and military
institutions should take precedence.
III. CRIMINAL TRIALS, COURTS-MARTIAL,
AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Aspects of the war model for responding to terrorism make sense;
the laws of war should apply when military invasions and occupations
are involved. Much of the response to terrorism has little to do with
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military action, however, and traditional criminal law methods should
remain the presumptive choice, precisely because they provide familiar restraints on government action. Mark Tushnet has suggested that
the kind of permanent emergency presupposed by an open-ended war
on terror risks “the end of the rule of law itself.” Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 39, 45 (Mark Tushnet ed.,
2005). I would prefer to say that the war model risks changing the way
the rule of law is produced and maintained, but his basic point holds.
Creating special courts and procedures for people who could be tried
in ordinary courts is an unnecessary step in most cases.
Still, the concern I mentioned about transsubstantive rules should
give pause. Broad doctrinal change, or acceleration of change already
underway, alters the way the rule of law operates. Or, if doctrine holds
firm, people may be acquitted and freed despite the fact that they
pose a risk of criminal behavior. Requiring criminal trials across the
board thus may not produce the most desirable set of results.
As I suggested earlier, one set of transsubstantive concerns derives
from evidentiary issues, including efforts to admit classified information without violating the Confrontation Clause. When those efforts
create too much tension with existing doctrine, courts-martial or even
military commissions might be more appropriate forums if the defendant’s alleged conduct violates the laws of war. But the decision to use
military courts should not be reserved for the executive. Congress
should provide that charges be filed in federal court, and if the government wishes to move the proceeding to a military court it must
convince the court that transfer is appropriate. In addition, any person tried before a military court, whether a court-martial or military
commission, should be able to appeal any conviction to an Article III
court. This structure is better than a hybrid court because it uses two
institutions—the federal courts and the military justice system—that
are well established and capable, rather than creating an entirely new
institution. Indeed, the problem with the post-9/11 military commissions has been not only that they risk being unfair, but also that they
have been difficult to create while under the watchful eyes of interest
groups that are seeking to tug the commissions in conflicting directions. I suspect the same issues would plague the domestic terror
courts that Professor Guiora proposes.
The other set of transsubstantive concerns applies directly to the
capture-interrogate-detain pipeline. The pipeline policy can be one
component of a larger response to terrorism, so long as officials abandon torture and allow meaningful judicial review. Criminal trials are
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consistent with this policy to the extent that imprisonment is seen as a
punitive response to terrorism, and the risk of acquittal in such cases is
likely to be small. But, where the goal is preventing future terrorism,
criminal trials are less likely to be an effective tool. Indeed, the preventive goals of the Bush administration’s “war on terror” explain why
terrorism trials put pressure on the definition of conspiracy: because
the aim is to secure and legitimize the detention of people who are
guilty by association, and thus pose some degree of risk, but who may
have taken few concrete actions. Detention, rather than trial, is a reasonable option for people in this category, as Jack Goldsmith and Neal
Katyal have also suggested, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, OpEd., The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19, and it is a
better option than hybrid courts.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Article III courts should be the primary option for noncitizens whose conduct fits within traditional and reasonable interpretations of federal criminal law. In some cases, evidentiary or other issues might justify transferring the proceedings to a military court. For
people who pose a risk but whose conduct may not violate federal
criminal law, prolonged preventive detention is the best choice. Importantly, however, policymakers should be clear about their goals
and the processes that serve those goals. Detention is not for everyone
swept up by U.S. troops or federal agents. The only people eligible for
preventive detention should be those who cannot easily be tried in Article III or military courts, and who qualify as prisoners of war or who
have been found to pose a risk of criminal activity after a hearing.
These hearings should be consistent with the standards Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld imposed for the detention of citizens, except that the government should bear the burden of proof and prisoners should have
counsel and an opportunity for meaningful federal court review. In
addition, prisoners held in preventive detention should receive periodic assessment of their status and conditions of confinement, followed by federal court review.
I have no illusions that the detention process would be free of error, and I do not think anyone should pretend that it would be. A policy and process of this kind can be legitimate only if officials are transparent about the reasons for its adoption and the kinds of factors that
are at play, and are also willing to modify those reasons and factors
when necessary. Transparency allows federal courts to look over the
executive’s shoulder and also ensures that Congress and others know
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how the policy is operating and can make informed choices about
whether to continue it. Further, preventive detention should be reserved for people who really pose a risk; it should not be an excuse to
warehouse suspicious people. But unless federal law is going to criminalize risk, trial in federal court will not be possible for every suspected terrorist who more probably than not poses a risk of violent
criminal activity.
Everyone else should be set free, placed into a program of supervised release, placed under surveillance, or sent elsewhere. Indeed,
one way to address the situation of many of the people in U.S. custody
is simply to return them to their home countries or extradite them to
countries interested in prosecuting them. Here, too, meaningful federal court review is necessary, including review of the treatment people are likely to receive in the other country.
My proposal is far from perfect. Indeed, it is arguably a hybrid
approach as well, because I add detention and military courts to a traditional criminal justice approach. Yet to the extent my proposal is a
hybrid, it is less disruptive than Professor Guiora’s and is therefore, I
think, worth considering.

371

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
PENNumbra

[Vol. 156: 356

CLOSING STATEMENT
Amos N. Guiora
Professor Parry raises several well-articulated and thoughtful responses to my domestic terror court proposal. As a matter of fact, Professor Parry all but endorses my hybrid paradigm proposal.
I.

ARTICLE III AND MILITARY COURTS AS “FALL BACKS”

Professor Parry argues that suspected terrorists should be tried in
Article III Courts, using military courts as “fall backs,” rather than
turning to my proposed domestic terror courts. Professor Parry suggests that Article III courts have been successful with respect to terrorism, and that the creation of a hybrid court is a “solution in search of a
problem.” However, in the same breath Professor Parry acknowledges
concerns surrounding both the admission of intelligence information
into evidence and providing the defendant with the right to confront
his or her accuser.
As a solution, Professor Parry suggests that “when those efforts
create too much tension,” a court-martial or military court may be
used as a fall back. That way, two existing institutions—federal courts
and military courts—can be used in lieu of creating an entirely new
court.
To me that sounds strikingly familiar—it is a re-articulated version
of my proposed domestic terror court. There is one difference:
rather than creating a new court, Professor Parry suggests either
bringing the individual to trial before a military commission or a
court-martial.
Neither proposition is satisfactory or appropriate. Courts-martial
are for soldiers; military commissions, as established by the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11, do not afford the necessary due
process. Their legitimacy was effectively destroyed when Brigadier
General Hartmann testified that information received from an individual subjected to waterboarding could be introduced in a military
commission trial. Professor Parry correctly states that my proposal
does not seek to insulate investigation practices. Quite the opposite—
my proposal aims to protect the individual both during investigation
and trial. In addition, it seeks to balance that interest with the state’s
need to bring forth information that otherwise could not be introduced.
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However, unlike Professor Parry’s proposal, my proposal seeks to
do this balancing in a civil context, rather than a military one. By relying on civilian judges instead of military judges, my proposal ensures
that the defendant will be brought to trial before an independent trier
of fact. Professor Parry’s suggestion that the suspect be brought before a military trier of fact is but the militarization of my proposal. His
proposal keeps the process “all in the family”—the executive detains,
interrogates, and prosecutes. Does it also sit on appeal? Either way,
justice is neither served nor rendered.
II. THE SPECTACLE CONTINUES: EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS
Professor Parry acknowledges concerns about introducing intelligence information into evidence. He seeks to allay those concerns by
pointing to the Confidential Information Procedures Act. Unquestionably, terrorism prosecutions raise difficult evidentiary issues. But
why suggest that resolution is best accomplished only by declassifying
information or somehow “giv[ing] information to defendants without
compromising national security”? Why even travel that route? Why
declassify vital intelligence information? Why run the risk of making a
mistake when domestic terror courts would allow for in camera presentation of intelligence information?
In my proposed domestic terror court, unlike traditional Article
III courts, if there is a need to introduce classified information, the
court would review the intelligence information and rigorously question either the source or the state representative regarding reliability
and corroboration. The information would assist the court in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence. However, a conviction
could not be based solely on classified information and the court
would be required to state that its decision to convict was primarily
(i.e., more than 50%) based on evidence submitted to the court,
thereby preserving the defendant’s right to confront his accuser.
If convicted, the defendant could appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court regarding conviction and/or the severity of punishment. That
is the essence of an independent judiciary. Professor Parry’s reliance
on a “military only” process is the very antithesis of the independent
judiciary so critical to the paradigm I propose.
Professor Parry correctly highlights my deep concern regarding
spectacles in terror cases. Zacarias Moussaoui is the poster child for
such concerns and spectacles. Such spectacles also occur—Professor
Parry reminds us of the O.J. Simpson trial—in nonterror cases. My response? Exactly. Remember the O.J. Simpson trial? Is that how we
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want to try terrorists? Is that the process we want for individuals who
commit heinous acts of terrorism, attacking and killing innocent civilians? Is that the dignity the process deserves? Clearly, Article III
courts are not the forum to try high-profile terrorism cases.
III. PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Professor Parry additionally suggests that in order to prevent future acts of terrorism, preventive detention is a “reasonable option”
for people who pose a “risk”—people who are guilty by association—
but who have not broken any federal criminal law. This is but a rearticulation of the two-tiered judicial model Israel has developed and
implemented over the past few decades. In this problematic paradigm, an individual is not brought to trial. Rather, he is administratively detained based on reliable, corroborated classified information
suggesting his involvement in future acts of terrorism. I have extensive professional experience—as prosecutor, judge and legal advisor—
with the administrative detention process. That experience leads me
to one unequivocal conclusion: the process must be, if at all possible,
avoided.
Under the Israeli paradigm, an individual is administratively detained if the sole basis for his detention is intelligence information. In
other words, there is no criminal evidence. The proposed hybrid
paradigm resolves that tension by enabling the state to bring such an
individual to trial, provided criminal evidence also exists. That course
of action is far preferable to administrative process.
FINAL THOUGHT
Professor Parry prefers an Article III process to a hybrid one. Or
does he? Is not the fall-back position he articulates nothing but a recantation of the domestic court I recommend? It appears to me that it
is, but with one major difference. Rather than establish domestic terror courts, Professor Parry recommends falling back on military courts
with no independent judicial review. Regarding the possibility of
spectacles—an issue of great concern to me—Professor Parry sanguinely reminds us of O.J. To that I reply, terrorism and the justice it
demands are too important for show.
These cases require sobriety and seriousness. They also frequently
require the introduction—unfortunately—of classified information.
The domestic terror court paradigm I propose addresses all these issues. Is it perfect? No. Does the present system require renovation?
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Yes. Do we require a judicial system specifically for terrorism? Yes. Is
terrorism going away? No. Therefore, we need to—quickly—adopt
the domestic terror court paradigm. Justice must be both rendered
and seen. Judicial independence is critical to the process. Civilian,
not military, courts are the appropriate route. My proposal is not
“problem seeking,” it is “problem solving”!
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CLOSING STATEMENT
John T. Parry
According to Professor Guiora, the United States and those acting
on its behalf hold as many as 25,000 people suspected of involvement
in activities defined in some way as “terrorist.” Our debate is about
what to do with these people. Professor Guiora argues that hybrid
courts are the best option. I agree that some innovation is warranted
given the situation in which we find ourselves. That is to say, neither
Professor Guiora nor I can do much about the often misguided policy
choices that have produced the situation we both are trying to address.
Nonetheless, our proposals, both in the ways they overlap and in
the ways they differ, offer more than ideas for getting out of a bad
situation. They also reflect our views on those policy choices and the
concerns that drove them. Professor Guiora, I think, is searching for a
new set of structures to address what he sees as a new situation or challenge, one that does not fit into familiar criminal law or war models
for deploying and restraining state violence. I am less convinced that
the situation is so new or that new approaches are necessary. As a result, I would prefer to use traditional models as much as possible and
to innovate only around the edges. In particular, I would rely as much
as possible on criminal trials in Article III courts and save hybrid approaches for relatively rare cases. I worry that departing from familiar
legal processes, and in particular creating hybrid courts of the kind
Professor Guiora proposes, inevitably will bring too much of the war
model into the mix.
Thus, although my version of a hybrid approach would mix criminal trials in Article III courts with military proceedings and preventive
detention for some of the people currently in custody, my strong preference is for putting suspects on trial in Article III courts or releasing
them (perhaps with conditions, monitoring, or surveillance). I am far
less enthusiastic about military courts and detention. I include military courts in my proposal because I take seriously the concerns that
Professor Guiora and others raise about Article III criminal trials. I
include preventive detention because I take seriously the claims of
government officials and policy makers that large numbers of people,
including many of the people currently in detention, pose a serious
risk of engaging in terrorist activities. It follows, for me, that military
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courts and preventive detention should be available when those concerns and claims bear fruit; they should not be automatic or easy
choices. That is why prosecutors should have to obtain permission
from an Article III court to transfer a case to a military proceeding.
Likewise, no one should be held in preventive detention without a real
hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof, the prisoner has counsel, and appeal to a federal court is available. Indeed, I
would not object to having the initial hearing itself in federal court.
Meaningful periodic review that either takes place in federal court or
is reviewable by federal courts should also be a requirement.
In his efforts to demonstrate that a hybrid domestic terror court
provides a better way, Professor Guiora offers a series of criticisms to
which I will attempt to respond. First, he seizes on my willingness to
accept military courts and reiterates his claim that they are not a viable
option. Again, I envision the use of military courts in rare cases, subject only to federal court approval and with full appeal rights to federal courts. Further, my goal was not to endorse the current military
commission process that Congress approved in a rush following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, although it is certainly better than the previous version cooked up by the Bush administration alone. Nor do I think much of Brigadier General Hartmann’s
suggestion that information obtained by waterboarding could be admissible in a military commission proceeding. Military commissions
should not be kangaroo courts.
Professor Guiora may be correct that any form of military commission will lack legitimacy. The Bush administration has made them an
integral part of the capture-interrogate-detain pipeline, where both
interrogation and detention are harsh and arbitrary at best, and where
military commissions serve—or appear to serve—a legitimizing function rather than a checking function. Put more bluntly, in their current form and in the context of current policy, military commissions
are a Potemkin village of process. A rational and effective policy for
dealing with large numbers of suspected terrorists could employ military commissions, which is why they are part of my proposal, but that
function may no longer be possible. Similarly, any other kind of military process may be equally as tainted.
Professor Guiora next raises the issue of classified information and
suggests there is no need to risk disclosure of sensitive information
because hybrid courts will provide a secure forum. The classified information concern is probably the most significant practical issue in
the debate over bypassing Article III courts. And I should make clear
my two-fold bias on this issue. First, I tend to believe that much classi-

377

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
PENNumbra

[Vol. 156: 356

fied information is simply not as sensitive as government officials
claim, particularly not by the time it might be introduced into evidence at a criminal trial, which could be years after it was gathered.
Second, I also suspect that reasonable people can resolve issues about
classified information in a variety of ways, such as in camera hearings
about admissibility and protection of information, the use of summaries and limited access, and even partial declassification. Compromises sometimes fail or fall apart, and people sometimes make mistakes, but those are not sufficient reasons, in my view, to abandon the
Article III process entirely.
The next issue is spectacle. Here my claims are simple. I am not
overly concerned about the dignity of the process so long as it is reasonably orderly and allows the presentation of issues and evidence in
ways that assist fact-finders. If those things sometimes happen in an
atmosphere of spectacle, so what? After all, the idea of the spectacular
trial goes well beyond the often controllable shenanigans of criminal
defendants. Nor are they simply “show” trials, as Professor Guiora
suggests. To the contrary, Martha Umphrey has observed that spectacular trials mediate between formal and informal sources of law by
providing “potential material for the articulation and elaboration of
legal principle and procedure” and serving as “cultural texts for public
consumption.” Martha Merrill Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal Meaning: Spectacular Trials, the Unwritten Law, and Narratives of Criminal Responsibility, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 393, 419-20 (1999). While that dynamic may not always be positive, defenders of transparency,
democracy, and open societies can find a lot to like in the spectacle of
the trial, even when it gets messy. When you hang your laundry out in
public, people get to know a lot about you, both good and bad—but
maybe that is the point.
Finally, Professor Guiora draws on his experience in Israel to reject the idea of preventive detention through administrative process. I
agree we should avoid detention as a wholesale response to terrorism
or consequence of counter-terrorist activities. I also agree that detention resulting from an administrative process is not ideal. That is why
I want federal courts to be part of the process at least at the appeal
stage, if not before, and why I would also make them part of a periodic
review process. I would also urge policymakers to go a step further
and place limits on the maximum amount of time a person may be detained. Detention for the duration of the “war on terror” is effectively
a life sentence, and I do not support that kind of detention in the absence of a criminal conviction. Holding a person for a maximum of,

2008]

TERROR COURTS

378

say, five years in decent conditions, by contrast, achieves protection
against risk without destroying due process values. In other words, it
strikes me as potentially a reasonable balance, which is what due process doctrine is all about (for better and for worse).
Although Professor Guiora objects to detention, his proposal is
not very clear on the amount of time and money it would take to conduct domestic terror court trials of 25,000 people, not to mention
what we do with them pending trial. Detention proceedings are likely
to be less costly. The cost of holding people in a time-limited detention is also likely to be lower than imprisoning terror court convicts
who presumably would receive long sentences. My point is not that
cost and efficiency must carry the day—in my initial contribution I
said they should not—but rather that they remain important factors.
The willingness to innovate and adopt hybrid approaches is admirable and important. In the context of trying suspected terrorists,
however, I fear that Professor Guiora’s solution raises more concerns
than the problems he is trying to address. For that reason above all
others, I prefer traditional approaches. If we are to make mistakes or
run aground, better to do so in sight of land than in open and uncharted seas.
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